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The number of preferential trade agreements (PTAs), establishing free trade 
areas (FTA) and customs unions (CU) has increased rapidly since the early 
1980s. These agreements are preferential in the sense that they offer free trade to 
members but protection against non-members. The first attempt to theorize 
about the subject was made by the great economist Jacob Viner in 1950. Ever 
since, the two-sided nature of preferential trade agreements has inspired 
economists around the world (Baldwin R., Bhagwati J., Krugman P., Panagariya 
A., Winters A., Wonnacott P, etc.). In 1950s and 1960, the theoretical analysis 
focused, in particular, on static questions concerning welfare effects. During 
recent years, interest has shifted to more dynamic questions: whether 
preferential trade arrangements hinder or promote the further liberalization 
initiatives and the process towards worldwide liberalization of trade.
Compared to the international trading powers such as the United States or 
the European Union, the three Baltic States, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are 
small. Altogether, they form a market size of about 8 million people with GNP 
per capita less than 20 percent of that in the United States.1 Small economies 
like the Baltic States are price takers in the world market. Traditional trade 
theory suggests that trade restrictions such as tariffs and quotas are costly to this 
type of economy. They divert resource allocation away from more productive 
uses and distort prices. In the absence of other distortions, a small competitive 
economy would maximize its welfare by having no tariffs at all. Indeed, the 
Baltic countries are relatively open economies. For example, the Baltic Free 
Trade Area for industrial products entered into force in January 1996 and for 
agricultural products in 1997. An agreement on the abolition of non-tariff 
barriers to trade among the Baltic States has been concluded and negotiations 
are proceeding on liberalization of services market. Trade with other countries, 
especially with the EU, with some of the Central and Eastern European and also 
with the EFTA countries, is also largely liberalized.
The aim of this study is to analyze preferential trade arrangements 
between the Baltic States and other countries, the EU in particular. The theory 
on regionalism constitutes the overall basis of the study and is used to explain 
some of the static and dynamic effects related to preferential trade arrangements. 
The work hypotheses tested are the six theses of new regionalism, presented by 
Wilfred Ethier:2
1. the new regionalism typically involves one or more small countries
linking up with a large country,



























































































3. the small countries have recently made, or are making, significant 
unilateral reforms,
4. regional arrangements often involve deep integration,
5. dramatic moves to free trade between members are not featured, and
6. the liberalization achieved is primarily by the small countries.”
The Study is organized in seven parts. Chapter 2 presents a theoretical overview 
on regionalism including some of the static and dynamic effects related to 
preferential trade arrangements. Chapter 3 focuses on the first two hypothesis of 
new regionalism; the role of geographical proximity in regional trade 
arrangements and the tendency of small countries linking up with a large 
country. The current regional trade arrangements of the Baltic States are 
reviewed. In addition, the top trading partners, the volume and the composition 
of the Baltic foreign trade is discussed. In Chapter 4, the hypotheses of new 
regionalism concerning the small countries making unilateral reforms and 
regional arrangements involving deep integration are analyzed in the context of 
the European Union eastern enlargement process. Chapter 5 takes a closer look 
at the preferential trade agreements -  Association Agreements -  between the 
Baltic States and the European Union. In particular, the study focuses on the 
claims that new regionalism involves modest trade concessions and that the 
liberalization achieved is primarily by small countries. The agreements are 
analyzed in terms of coverage, the degree of liberalization in industrial and 
agricultural trade, rules of origin and other commercial policy measures. While 
Chapters 3-5 evaluate whether the six specific hypothesis of new regionalism 
apply to the preferential trade agreements between the EU and the Baltic States, 
Chapter 6, in turn, extends the analysis from the EU to the multilateral level. In 
particular, the discussion returns to the more general, but fundamental question 
of new regionalism: whether preferential trade agreements hinder or promote 
further trade liberalization initiatives. First, the main principles of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO), including its policy towards preferential trade 
agreements are discussed. In addition, Association Agreements between the EU 
and the Baltic countries are asessed from the perspective of WTO principles. 





























































































Regionalism and Preferential Trade Agreements
Old Regionalism - Static and Systemic Effects of PTAs
Regionalism can generally be defined as a tendency towards some form of 
preferential trading arrangement between a number of countries belonging to a 
particular region. Furthermore, the word “preferential” refers to a club; 
countries that do not belong to a particular regional arrangement are 
discriminated against. Academic literature makes a distinction between old and 
new regionalism. In the 1950s and 1960s, many attempts were made around the 
world to form regional trading clubs: customs unions (CUs) and free trade areas 
(FTAs). However, most of these attempts, excluding the European Common 
Market, did not really succeed. Those efforts are associated with what is 
sometimes called the “old” or “first” regionalism.4 The re-emergence of regional 
trade agreements (RTAs) inside Europe has been substantial since the 
establishment of the European Community. While in 1960s, there were only 
three essential RTAs among European countries, today the number of RTAs 
exceeds 90.5 About 15 of these RTAs are inside Western Europe, 20 inside 
Eastern Europe, and around 55 between Eastern and Western European 
countries.6 Worldwide, GATT/WTO has been notified of 184 regional trade 
agreements, of which 109 are still in force.7 The last decade, during which many 
of the above mentioned RTAs have been established, is sometimes called the 
“new” or “second” regionalism.
The discriminatory feature of regional trade agreements has been subject 
to extensive research among economists. During the first regionalism, the 
theoretical analysis focused, in particular, on static questions concerning welfare 
effects. The early development of the theory of Preferential Trade Agreements 
(PTAs) has been associated with academics, such as Jacob Viner (1950 and 
1951), James Meade (1953 and 1955), and Richard Lipsey (1958). Viner, in his 
famous book of “the Customs Union Issue”, made a distinction between trade 
creation and trade diversion. The trade-creating union would increase trade 
among the members at the expense of inefficient industries inside the member 
countries. The trade-diverting union, on the other hand, would create trade at the 
expense of more efficient industries in non-member countries. To put it slightly 
differently, Viner argued that a preferential trade arrangement, such as a 
customs union, is trade-creating when at least one of the members must benefit, 
both may benefit and the two together have a net benefit. The outside world, 
however, loses in the short-run; but it can gain in the longer-run, due to the 
general diffusion of the increased property of the customs area. Where trade 




























































































may be injured, the two together will suffer a net loss, and there will be damages 
to the outside world.
Ever since Viner’s attempts in theorizing about PTAs, trade theorists and 
policymakers have been challenged by the question of whether the issue of trade 
diversion should be taken seriously, or would any move towards free trade, even 
if preferential, be welfare-improving. In general, economic theory is not fully 
against PTAs. The rest of this chapter will focus on some of the modern 
extensions of Viner’s analysis.
The claim of “Natural Trading Partners”8 states that if PTAs are formed 
among “natural trading partners”, i.e. countries among which the initial volume 
of trade is high, and the distance between them is low, one could expect them to 
be welfare-improving for the members. The argument implies that high initial 
volume of trade among members and a short geographical distance between 
trading countries reduces the potential for trade diversion. This argument has 
some similarities with the traditional gravity theory on bilateral trade patterns, 
according to which trade between two countries depends positively on incomes 
of trading countries and negatively on the distance between them.9
In contrast to the ‘natural trading partner’ argument, it has been argued 
that the actual trade diversion will reflect not the average initial trade volumes - 
“The Volume-of-Trade Criterion”- but the underlying fundamentals such as 
substitution among products.10 Under these circumstances, with each member 
country specialized in a different product when all products are imperfect 
substitutes, the steady preferential reduction of tariffs by one country on another 
will first improve its welfare and then progressively reduce it at some stage. 
Consequently, reaching a 100% reduction, an FTA may reduce welfare even 
below the starting level.11 This argument that PTAs with less than 100 percent 
preferences are superior to FTAs was first introduced by Meade (1955). The key 
to this result is the declining marginal utility for the consumption of each 
variety. The welfare effects of trade creation become negligible at a certain 
point, while trade diversion effects become larger. This is because varieties of 
products with larger marginal utility, meaning those products from other foreign 
non-member countries, are replaced by product varieties from member 
countries, which have smaller marginal utility.12
One approach along the lines of Viner is that of Kemp and Wan (1976). 
They showed that if countries were to form a CU, and could choose their 
external tariff, they could always form a CU, which left the welfare of the non­




























































































An interesting extension to the static welfare effects of PTAs deals with 
their systemic effects. They are caused by that fact that one tries to restrict or 
liberalize trade on the basis of which product comes from which country. In 
order to do so, a country must establish a ‘rule of origin’, which often leads into 
problems of arbitrary definitions of origin. This difficulty is present both in 
FTAs and CUs (although in a smaller scale than in FTAs). For example, an FTA 
inevitably requires that the origin is defined for all traded products. This can 
lead to arbitrariness in trying to identify the origin of products. The problem 
becomes even more acute because in an FTA there are different external tariffs 
among members which, in turn, creates the fear of non-member products 
coming into one’s territory at lower tariff than one’s own (by entering through 
another lower-tariff member country). Finally, FTAs are often negotiated at 
different points of time and with different time schedules for reaching zero 
tariffs. As a result, we can find a complicated set of applicable tariffs on the 
same product. These rules generate a world of preferences increasing transaction 
costs and facilitating protectionism. This phenomenon is known as the 
“spaghetti bowl” phenomenon.13
New Regionalism and Dynamic Approach
Since the old regionalism, the whole international trading environment has 
changed dramatically. First of all, the multilateral liberalization of trade in 
manufactured goods among the industrial countries is much more complete now, 
thanks to the GATTAVTO rounds of multilateral tariff reductions. In addition, 
less developed and former communist countries are nowadays more actively 
trying to integrate into the multilateral trading system. The old inward-oriented, 
communist and import substitution policies have given way to more market- 
oriented and open trade policies.
Motives behind new regional trade arrangements may be country -  or 
region -specific. Nevertheless, some common characteristics of the new 
regionalism have been observed:
“regional integration now usually involves reform-minded small countries purchasing
with moderate trade concessions, links with a large, often a neighboring country that
involve deep integration but that confer relatively minor trade advantages.” 14
While the majority of the so called deep integration schemes are taking place in 
Europe, the other regional trade arrangements -  those established in North and 
Latin America - have involved relatively shallow integration with long transition 




























































































In addition to the international trading environment, the focus of 
theoretical research has also changed during the new regionalism. While the first 
regionalism concentrated on static welfare effects of PTAs, the new regionalism 
has put more emphasis on dynamic issues: i.e., whether PTAs hinder or promote 
the worldwide nondiscriminatory reduction process of trade barriers. 
Furthermore, if PTAs pose a threat to global trade liberalization, what is the 
nature of this threat?
Among the trade theorists, the question of how preferential trade 
agreements influence trade liberalization worldwide remains open. Just as there 
are various interpretations about the static welfare effects of PTAs, theories 
about dynamic effects provide mixed results as well. 16
In terms of trade liberalization in general, it has been argued that dynamic 
output effects of trade liberalization are substantial, and perhaps significantly 
larger than the static effects analyzed in earlier studies.17 The reasoning behind 
this argument is that trade liberalization may, other things being equal, raise the 
marginal productivity of human and physical capital. Provided that the steady- 
state levels of these factors are determined endogenously, trade policy can have 
an influence over these levels. Consequently, liberalization of trade can have a 
dynamic effect on output and welfare as the economy moves towards a new 
steady state. The overall welfare effects resulting from trade liberalization and 
the additional output depends on the degree of external scale economies.18
Referring to the studies on regional trade liberalization in particular, it has 
been argued that when PTAs (preferential trade agreements) and MTN 
(multilateral trade negotiations) are separable (meaning that one neither hurts 
nor helps the other), PTAs may either improve or reduce welfare immediately 
(in the static sense). In either case, the time-path could then be stagnated, which 
would imply a fragmentation of the world economy and no further expansion of 
the initial PTA. This type of time-path would also fall short compared to the 
time-path representing the worldwide freeing of trade on a nondiscriminatory 
basis at a specified time (the ultimate goal). An alternative path would lead to 
multilateral free trade for all through a continued increase in PTAs. The other 
situation is when PTAs and MTN interact. In this case, the MTN time-path 
becomes a function of whether the PTA time-path travels simultaneously.19
One of the studies on PTAs suggests that preferential trade arrangements 
such as free trade arrangements complicate the way in which externalities 
associated with trade are transmitted across countries.20 Under these 
circumstances, the principle of reciprocity21 can no longer produce efficient 
multilateral outcomes for its members. The same study finds an interesting 




























































































trading system is actually possible, but only when the member countries share 
similar political preferences.
Many of the dynamic time-path analyses take the membership of a PTA 
and its expansion as exogenous and examine its consequences. Some studies, 
instead, treat the time-path as endogenous. Under this assumption, one of the 
conclusions has been that the PTA will eventually create a domino effect, with 
outsiders wanting to become insiders, increasing the incentives to add members 
to preferential trade area.22 The main idea behind this argument is that the cost 
for non-membership (tariffs that member countries’ firms do not need to pay) 
drives firms to lobby for pro-integration. This (if the non-member country’s 
government was previously indifferent to membership) may enlarge the market 
and add countries one after the other (the domino). At the end, this could lead to 
a point, where trade barriers have been freed worldwide (a situation where every 
country belongs to the same preferential trading area).
While some economists argue that any liberalization makes further 
liberalization easier, provided that it increases both imports and exports,23 others 
instead suggest that the bilateral FTAs can undermine political support for 
multilateral free trade.24 In addition, PTAs may reduce the incentive of the two 
member countries to liberalize tariffs reciprocally with the non-member world, 
and this incentive could be so reduced that it would make multilateral trade 
liberalization impossible.25
Some of the most recent studies about static welfare effects of regional 
integration arrangements indicate that effects are more positive than negative. 
For example, it has been shown that regional trade arrangements are welfare 
improving if they are formed by countries which are predominantly least-cost 
producers of export goods, or if they give rise to increased imports from all 
trading partners.26 However, the same study concludes that currently, there are 
hardly any, if any, such customs unions or free trade areas that would fully meet 
these criteria. Recent empirical studies, which have focused on regional trade 
arrangements in Europe and North America, suggest that presently operating 
regional trade arrangements have caused a modest positive impact on member 
countries and a minor impact on non-member economies.27 In addition, there 
seems to be less evidence indicating that a well-functioning regional trade 





























































































Foreign Trade and Regional Trade Arrangements of the Baltic States
Table 1 illustrates the variety of preferential trade arrangements currently 
existing between the Baltic countries and other countries. In addition to the EU, 
Estonia has Free Trade Agreements with EFT A countries, the Czech Republic, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Turkey and Ukraine. Furthermore, negotiations to establish 
free trade agreements were concluded with Poland and Hungary last year.29 
Latvia has concluded free trade agreements with the EU and the EFTA, the 
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia and Turkey. Moreover, Latvia has a free 
trade agreement with Ukraine.30 The provisional application of the Free Trade 
Agreement with Poland is proceeding. Latvia is presently also negotiating free 
trade agreements with Hungary and Romania, and is planning to start 
negotiations with Bulgaria.31 In the case of Lithuania, Free Trade Agreements 
have been concluded, in addition to the EU and EFTA members, with the Czech 
Republic, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Turkey and Ukraine. Moreover, a free 
trade agreement has been initiated with Hungary, and negotiations with 
Romania are proceeding.32 Finally, the three Baltic countries are part of their 
own Baltic Free Trade Area.
All in all, two conclusions can be made. First, smaller Baltic countries 
seem to have regional trade arrangements with larger countries. Second, all of 
these countries are in Europe and are geographically relatively close in location 
to the Baltic States. Hence, the first two hypotheses of new regionalism -  small 
countries usually linking up with a large country and regional arrangements 
being regional also geographically - seem to apply to the preferential trade 
arrangements between the Baltic States and other countries.
Table 1. Regional Trade Agreements of the Baltic States
W ith  th e  E U W ith  O th e r  C o u n c i l  o f  E u r o p e  
M e m b e r s 33
Estonia F T A /E u r o p e  A g r e e m e n t34 B F T A 35 m e m b e r
F T A s  w i th  E F T A J“ m e m b e r s ,  
C z e ,  S ik ,  S lo ,  T k y ,  P o l ,  H u n ,  
U k r ” .
Latvia F T A /E u r o p e  A g r e e m e n t B F T A  m e m b e r
F T A s  w i th  E F T A  m e m b e r s ,  
C z e ,  S lk ,  S lo ,  T k y ,  U k r .
Lithuania F T A /E u r o p e  A g r e e m e n t B F T A  m e m b e r
F T A s  w i th  E F T A  m e m b e r s ,  




























































































Have these preferential trade arrangements been welfare improving for the 
Baltic economies? Have they created trade instead of diverting it? Tables 2-4 
illustrate the Baltic States’ volume of trade with their top trading partners in 
1993 and 1998. Tables 5-7 illustrate the product composition of trade during the 
same years.38 Several interesting observations can be made. First, statistics 
indicate that Baltic foreign trade is currently focused on the European continent 
(as the collapse of the Former Soviet Union broke old trade relations and urged a 
shift towards new, western markets). Second, Baltic foreign trade is focused not 
only in terms of the continent, but also as regards the concentration of trade 
inside Europe. The EU appears to be the most important trading partner for all 
Baltic economies. Also the trade volume with the EU has increased to a large 
extent. This indicates that preferential trade agreements between the Baltic 
countries and the EU have had trade-creating influence. Third, inside the EU, 
some of the Union members have stronger trade relations with the Baltic States 
than others.39 Especially for Estonia and Latvia, the most dominant EU trading 
partners are Finland, Sweden and Germany. Germany, together with Italy, 
Denmark and the U.K., seem currently to be the most active EU-traders with 
Lithuania. Another interesting observation that can be made form the trade data 
is that, contrary to earlier expectations, the preferential free trade agreements (in 
industrial and agricultural products) among the Baltic States have not 
substantially increased intra-Baltic trade flows. One of the main reasons for the 
low level of intra-Baltic trade is that the trade structure of the three states is 
largely competitive rather than complementary.40 Another explanation for low 
levels of intra-Baltic trade could be the fact that the Baltic market was/is 
relatively small market, and therefore not as attractive as, for example, the EU 
market. Furthermore, the cooperation initiatives might have been dampened if 
they were seen to be competing with efforts aimed at EU accession. In addition, 
as has been the case in CEFTA, resistance to new bureaucracy, and 
consequently a lack of official and effective enough structure that could enforce 
the regional rules has been an obstacle to the further regional integration 
efforts.41 Also, the lack of trade finance and the imperfect regulatory framework 
may also have imposed constraints on the development of intra-Baltic regional 
trade. Finally, one important reason for low levels of intra-Baltic trade compared 
to EU-Baltic trade deals with macroeconomic framework, namely the Baltic 




























































































Table 2. Estonia’s Trading Partners, percentage of total exports or imports
(in million kroons)
1 9 9 3 1 9 9 8
E x p o r t s I m p o r t s E x p o r t s I m p o r t s
T o ta l 1 0 0
( 1 0 6 3 6 .2 )
1 0 0
( 1 1 8 3 1 .6 )
1 0 0
( 4 5  2 3 6 .7 )
1 00
( 6 6  9 7 5 .5 )
R u s s ia 2 3
( 2 4 0 8 .5 )
F in la n d 2 8
( 3 3 0 3 .5 )
F in la n d 19
( 8 4 7 3 .3 )
F in la n d 2 3
( 1 5  1 6 3 .8 )
F in la n d 21
( 2 2 0 2 .6 )
R u s s ia 17
( 2 0 3 3 .3 )
S w e d e n 17
( 7 4 6 3 .2 )
R u s s i a 11
( 7 4 3 7 .2 )
S w e d e n 10
( 1 0 0 7 .5 )
G e r m a n y
( 1 2 7 2 .8 )
R u s s ia 13
( 6 0 8 2 .3 )
G e r m a n y 11
( 7 2 5 8 .4 )
L a tv ia 9
( 9 1 3 .5 )
S w e d e n 9
( 1 0 5 5 .0 )
L a tv ia 10
( 4 2 9 4 .7 )
S w e d e n 9
( 6 0 5 4 .5 )
G e r m a n y r
( 8 5 1 .3 )
H o l la n d 4
( 4 2 9 .1 )
G e r m a n y 6
( 2 4 9 2 .2 )
J a p a n 5
( 3 2 8 4  8 )
H o lla n d 4
( 4 3 0 .9 )
L i th u a n ia 3
( 3 9 1 .0 )
U k r a in e 5
( 2 2 6 6 .6 )
U S . 5
( 3 0 9 5 .7 )
O th e r 2 6 O th e r 2 7 O th e r 3 0 O th e r 36
E U 4 8
( 1 8 9 4 .9 )
E U 61
( 2 7 6 0 .7 )
E U 55
( 2 4 7 6 9 .4 )
E U 6 0
( 4 0  2 7 8 .4 )
C IS 3 0
( 3 2 2 8 .7 )
C I S 2 2
( 2 5 5 1 .1 )
C I S 21
( 9 4 5 3 .1 )
C I S 14
( 9 4 8 9 .3 )
O th e r  B a l t ic  
S ta te s
12
( 1 3 0 7 .4 )
O th e r  B a l t i c  
S ta te s
6
( 6 5 8 .4 )
O th e r  B a l t ic  
S ta te s
14
( 6 4 2 1 .2 )
O t h e r  B a l t i c  
S ta te s
4
( 2 4 4 8 .9 )
Source: Statistical Office of Estonia.
Table 3. Latvia’s Trading Partners, percentage of total exports or imports 
(in thousand lats)
1 9 9 4 1 9 9 8
E x p o r t s I m p o r t s E x p o r t s I m p o r t s
T o ta l U X T
( 5 5 3 4 3 7 )
1 0 0
( 6 9 4 5 8 8 )
1 00
( 1 0 6 8 8 5 2 )
10 0
( 1 8 8 1 2 8 5 )
R u s s ia 2 iP
( 1 5 5 7 1 9 )
R u s s ia 2 4 ^
( 1 6 4 1 7 8 )
G e r m a n y 16
( 1 6 6 8 2 2 )
G e r m a n y 17
( 3 1 5 5 4 7 )
G e r m a n y 11
( 5 8 2 7 1 )
G e r m a n y 14
( 9 4 0 1 1 )
U .K . 14
( 1 4 4 3 4 3 )
R u s s i a 12
( 2 2 1 2 9 0 )
U .K . 10
( 5 3 8 9 4 )
F in la n d 9
( 5 9 1 0 2 )
R u s s ia 12
( 1 2 9 0 0 7 )
F in la n d 10
( 1 7 9 1 8 9 )
S w e d e n 7
( 3 8 1 1 4 )
S w e d e n 6
( 4 4 4 9 4 )
S w e d e n 10
( 1 1 0 0 1 7 )
S w e d e n 7
( 1 3 5 0 9 6 )
U k r a in e 6
( 3 2 7 2 7 )
L i th u a n ia 6
( 4 1 2 4 3 )
L i th u a n ia 7
( 7 9 3 2 5 )
E s to n ia 7
( 1 2 4 8 2 7 )
L i th u a n ia 6
( 3 0 6 9 4 )
E s to n ia 4
( 2 4 4 1 2 )
E s to n ia 5
( 4 8 5 2 6 )
L i th u a n ia 6
( 1 1 8 5 1 8 )
O th e r 3 2 O th e r 3 7 O th e r 3 6 O th e r 41
E U 3 9
( 2 1 7 0 4 4 )
E U 41
( 2 8 1 6 8 5 )
E U 5 7
( 6 0 4 4 5 9 )
E U 55
( 1 0 3 9 4 9 2 )
C IS 4 3
( 2 3 6 3 7 5 )
C I S 3 0
( 2 1 1 6 0 0 )
C I S 19
( 2 0 2 6 1 1 )
C I S 16
( 3 0 1 0 6 3 )
O th e r  B a l t ic  
S ta te s
8
( 4 5 0 5 4 )
O t h e r  B a l t i c  
S ta te s
10
( 6 5 6 5 7 )
O th e r  B a l t i c  
S ta te s
12
( 1 2 7 8 5 1 )
O t h e r  B a l t ic  
S ta te s
13
( 2 4 3 3 4 5 )




























































































Table 4. Lithuania’s Trading Partners, percentage of total exports or imports
(in million litas)
1 9 9 3 1 9 9 8
E x p o r t s I m p o r t s E x p o r t s I m p o r t s
T o ta l 1 0 0
( 8 7 0 7 .0 )
100
( 9 7 9 8 .2 )
1 0 0
( 1 4 8 4 9 .2 )
100
( 2 3 1 8 6 .2 )
R u s s ia 33
( 2 8 8 4 .7 )
R u s s ia 5 4
( 5 2 5 6 .6 )
R u s s ia 17
( 2 4 8 4 .6 )
R u s s ia 21
(4 8 9 1  2 )
U k r a in e 11
( 9 7 7 .5 )
G e r m a n y 10
( 9 4 5 .3 )
G e r m a n y 13
( 1 9 1 9 .0 )
G e r m a n y 18
( 4 1 8 7 .3 )
B e la ru s 7
( 6 4 1 .2 )
U k r a in e 6
( 6 0 9 .3 )
L a tv ia 11
( 1 6 5 9 .5 )
P o la n d 6
( 1 2 9 9 .0 )
L a tv ia 7
( 6 3 5 .7 )
B e la ru s 3
( 3 2 5 .8 )
B e la r u s 5 1
( 1 3 0 7 .4 )
I ta ly 5
( 1 0 3 2 .0 )
P o la n d n
( 6 0 8 .0 )
D e n m a r k 2
( 2 3 9 .3 )
U k r a in e 8
( 1 1 9 2 .3 )
D e n m a r k 4
( 8 7 9 .9 )
G e r m a n y 7
( 5 9 2 .0 )
N e th e r l a n d s 2
( 2 2 3 .9 )
I ta ly 4
( 5 9 5 .9 )
U .K 4
( 8 5 7 .1 )
O th e r 2 8 O th e r 2 3 O th e r 3 8 O th e r 42
E u r o p e “J 9 3
( 8 1 1 7 .5 )
E u r o p e 9 4
( 9 2 4 4 .0 )
E U 3 7
( 5 5 5 1 .1 )
E U 47
( 1 0 9 6 0 .0 )
C IS 5 C I S 2 6 C I S 3 6
( 5 3 7 1 .0 )
C I S 2 6
( 6 0 2 2 .2 )
O th e r  B a l t ic  
S ta te s
10
( 8 5 4 .5 )
O th e r  B a l t i c  
S ta te s
2
( 2 2 1 .2 )
O th e r  B a l t i c  
S ta te s
14
( 2 0 6 1 .2 )
O t h e r  B a l t ic  
S ta te s
3
( 7 7 5 .3 )
Source: Statistical Office of Lithuania.
An interesting observation indicated by trade data concerns the Central and 
Eastern European trade partners. With the exception of Poland, none of the 
Central and Eastern European countries with which the Baltic countries have 
free trade agreements, appears (yet) on the top trading partner list. This result 
could partly reflect the fact that some of these free trade agreements have been 
concluded only recently and their effects are therefore still to be seen. Finally, 
although the Baltic countries do not have preferential trade agreements with 
Russia, the argument linking geographical proximity with trade partners is 
particularly true in case of Russia. Russia is located close to the Baltic States. 
Moreover, it has been, and still is, an important trade partner with the Baltic 
economies.
With regard to the general composition of foreign trade, the main changes 
are illustrated in Tables 5-7. In Estonia (Table 5.), the share of machinery has 
increased significantly and, at present, forms the largest part of foreign trade, 
both in exports and imports. Although the overall share of foodstuffs in foreign 
trade has declined, it still remains significant. In addition to machinery, trade in 
wood, wood articles, paper and textiles constitute other important parts of 
Estonia’s exports. Only minor changes have taken place regarding the shares of 




























































































In I at via, exports are still dominated by trade in wood and related articles 
(Table 6). The second on the ‘most traded product’ list is textiles. Their share in 
foreign trade, both in exports and imports, has not changed significantly over the 
years. While the shares of both exports and imports of foodstuffs have declined, 
no substantial changes have taken place in the trade of chemical products. The 
role of machinery has increased significantly during the period in question and 
now constitutes the biggest share of imports.
As in Estonia, trade in machinery forms the biggest part of foreign trade 
in Lithuania (Table 7). Its share both in exports and imports has increased over 
the last years. Mineral products and textiles constitute the second and third most 
important parts of foreign trade. While the share of exported minerals has 
remained relatively steady, the share of imported minerals has declined 
considerably. The export share of textiles has slightly increased. Finally, during 
the years under review, the share of chemical products in the overall trade has 
remained relatively steady, whereas food exports have declined considerably.
Referring to the composition of trade with individual PTA partners, the 
analysis is partly constrained by the limited data available from the Baltic 
statistical sources.44 Given the importance of the EU as a trading partner for the 
Baltic States, some comments can be made concerning the composition of EU- 
Baltic trade.45 Estonia presently imports mainly machinery and electrical 
equipment, textiles and agricultural products from the EU. The main products 
exported to the EU are machinery, textiles and wood. Latvia’s imports from the 
EU consist primarily of machinery, foodstuffs and textiles. The most common 
products exported to the EU are wood products, textiles and base metals. 
Finally, Lithuania exports mainly textiles, machinery, mineral products and 
chemicals to the EU. Imports from the EU consist primarily of machinery, 
vehicles and textiles.
The recent study by Kaitila & Widgren (1999) shows that, measured for 
1993 and 1996, the overall level of intra-industry trade between the EU and the 
Baltic countries was relatively low, but that it has been increasing relatively 
rapidly. In addition, the study suggests that the Baltic States are very similar to 
one another in the EU markets in terms of the Baltic economies’ revealed 
comparative advantage. Their comparative advantage is seen in wood and 
related articles, as well as in oil, which is mainly transit trade from Russia. 
Moreover, the study suggests that the Baltic countries’ potential comparative 
advantage in the future lies in processed agricultural goods, which currently play 




























































































Table 5. Estonia’s trade by groups of goods (percentage of exports or imports)
1 9 9 3 1 9 9 8
E x p o r t s I m p o r t s E x p o r t s I m p o r t s
F o o d s tu f f s 2 3 .4 1 4 .7 F o o d s tu f f s 1 5 .9 1 6 .9
M in e r a l
p r o d u c t s
7 .6 1 5 .5 M in e r a l
p r o d u c t s
3 .8 5 .9
P r o d u c ts  o f
c h e m ic a l
in d u s t r y
4 .7 6 .4 P r o d u c ts  o f  
c h e m ic a l  
i n d u s t r y
7 .2 8 .1
T e x t i l e s  a n d  
f o o tw e a r
1 3 .5 1 1 .5 T e x t i l e s  a n d  
f o o tw e a r
1 1 .6 7 .5
W o o d ,  p a p e r  
e tc .
8 .1 2 .8 W o o d ,  p a p e r  
e tc .
1 4 .5 4 .3
B a s e  m e ta l s  
a n d  a r t i c le s  
o f  b a s e  m e ta l
1 0 .4 5 X T N o n ­
p r e c io u s  
m e t a l s  a n d  
m e ta l  
p r o d u c t s
8 .5 9 .3
M a c h in e r y
a n d
e q u ip m e n t
7 .6 1 7 .7 M a c h i n e r y
a n d
e q u ip m e n t
1 9 .6 2 5 .4
T r a n s p o r t
v e h ic l e s
1 0 .6 1 4 .2 T r a n s p o r t
v e h ic l e s
4 .8 9 .4
O th e r 14 .1 1 2 .2 F u r n i tu r e  e tc . 4 j l 1 .6
O th e r  g o o d s 7 .0 7 .4
T o ta l 1 0 0 .0 1 0 0 .0 T o ta l 1 0 0 .0 1 0 0 .0
Source: Bank of Estonia, Statistical Office of Estonia
Table 6. Latvia’s trade by groups of goods (percentage of exports and imports)
1 9 9 5 1 9 9 8
E x p o r t s I m p o r t s E x p o r t s I m p o r t s
F o o d s tu f f s  a n d  
a n im a l  p r o d u c ts
1 5 .7 1 0 .2 F o o d s tu f f s  a n d  
a n im a l  p r o d u c t s
5 .5 4 .7
M in e r a l  p r o d u c t s 2 .2 2 1 .7 M in e r a l  p r o d u c t s 0 .4 8 .6
P r o d u c ts  o f  
c h e m ic a l  i n d u s t r y
6 .4 1 1 .3 P r o d u c ts  o f  
c h e m ic a l  in d u s t r y
5 .2 8 .2
W o o d  a n d  w o o d  
a r t i c l e s
2 6 .4 4 .5 W o o d  a n d  w o o d  
a r t i c l e s
3 2 .0 3 .6
T e x t i l e s  a n d  
f o o tw e a r
1 4 .7 8 .5 T e x t i l e s  a n d  
f o o tw e a r
15 .1 5 .8
M e ta l s 7 .9 6 .4 M e ta l s 1 0 .0 4.1
M a c h in e r y 8 .7 1 7 .3 M a c h in e r y ,  
t r a n s p o r t  v e h ic l e s
8 .5 3 1 .2
O th e r 1 8 .0 2 0 .1 O t h e r 2 3 .3 3 3 .8
T o ta l 1 0 0 .0 1 0 0 .0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 .0




























































































Table 7. Lithuania’s trade by groups of goods (percentage of exports or imports)
1 9 9 4 1 9 9 8
E x p o r t s I m p o r t s E x p o r t s I m p o r t s
L iv e  l iv e s to c k  a n d  
a n im a l  p r o d u c t io n
8.8 1 .5 L iv e  l iv e s to c k  a n d  
a n im a l  p r o d u c t io n
6.6 3 .2
F o o d s tu f f s 1 5 .2 8 .4 F o o d s tu f f s 4 .4 5 .0
M in e r a l  p r o d u c ts 1 6 .6 3 2 .7 M in e r a l  p r o d u c t s 1 8 .9 1 5 .4
P r o d u c t io n  o f  
c h e m ic a l  a n d  
r e l a te d  i n d u s t r ie s
10.6 8 .7 P r o d u c t io n  o f  
c h e m ic a l  a n d  
r e l a te d  i n d u s t r ie s
9 .5 9 .2
W o o d  a n d  w o o d  
p r o d u c t s
4 .0 2.8 W o o d  a n d  w o o d  
p r o d u c t s
4 .7 -
T e x t i l e s  a n d  
f o o tw e a r
1 3 .3 tT T e x t i l e s 1 8 .3 8 .9
M e ta l s 6.1 6 .4 M e ta l s Tin 6.2
M a c h in e r y  a n d  
t r a n s p o r t  v e h ic le s
1 5 .7 2 2 .5 M a c h in e r y  a n d  
t r a n s p o r t  v e h ic le s
1 9 .8 1 8 .9
O th e r 9 .7 9 .2 O th e r 1 3 .0 20.2
T o ta l 1 0 0 .0 100.0 T o ta l 100.0 100.0
Source: Department of Statistics to the Government of the Republic of Lithuania
To conclude, at present, there are over 30 preferential trade agreements in force 
between the Baltic States and other countries. Moreover, many of the Baltic 
regional trade arrangements have been established with larger and 
geographically close countries. Over half of the Baltic foreign trade is focused 
on the European continent, the EU being the most important trade partner. The 
volume of trade has increased between the Baltic States and the Union, which 
could reflect the positive, trade-creating impact resulting from the preferential 
trade agreements between the parties. Inside the EU, some of the Union 
members are more active traders with the Baltic States than others. With regard 
to the composition of trade, exports from the Baltic States to the EU are 
currently dominated by wood, base metals, machinery and textiles. Imports from 
the Union consist mainly of machinery and technology. This outcome seems to 
be logical for transition economies which need new technology to raise output 
and export potential. Given the ongoing restructuring and the accession 
preparations for EU membership, the demand for investment goods in the Baltic 
countries is likely to remain in the future. Furthermore, in the long-run, as the 
differences in per capita GDP between the EU and the Baltic economies narrow, 
the share of intra-industry trade is likely to increase.
The Baltic countries’ strong reorientation towards the West after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union and nearly ten years of political and economic 
cooperation with the EU, and especially the Baltic countries’ current aspirations 
to become EU-members, reflect the importance of the EU to the Baltic 




























































































policy-maker which has influence over political and economic decision-making 
in the Baltic States. For this reason, the rest of this study will focus on the 
preferential trade relations of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania with the EU. In 
particular, we will analyze the following questions. What role do preferential 
trade arrangements play in the EU enlargement process and the Baltic States’ 
accession preparations? What are the sorts of preferential trade agreements - 
Association Agreements - in force between the EU and the individual Baltic 
countries? How have the Association Agreements contributed to trade 
liberalization over the years, and what is the degree of liberalization today? Do 
these preferential trading arrangements pose a threat to the WTO principles and 
the idea of multilateral trade liberalization?
PTAs as a Part of the European Union’s Enlargement Process47
Chapter 3 concluded that the Baltic regional trade arrangements support the two 
hypothesis of new regionalism: the smaller Baltic States have preferential trade 
arrangements with larger countries, and these regional arrangements are also 
geographically regional. In this Chapter, it is argued that there are also other 
characteristics of new regionalism -  small countries making significant 
unilateral reforms and regional arrangements involving deep integration -  which 
apply to the preferential trade arrangements between the Baltic States and the 
EU.
In June 1997 the Amsterdam European Council called for accession 
negotiations to begin in 1998. One month later, the Commission published its 
Agenda 2000 document and opinions (avis) on each applicant’s ability to accept 
the body of EU-law (acquis communautaire). The December 1997 Luxembourg 
Council decided that negotiations should be started with five Central and 
Eastern European countries and Cyprus, and with another five countries when 
they have made the necessary progress required for accession.Negotiations 
finally began on 30 March 1998 with the first wave of six countries: Cyprus, the 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia. These will be followed 
by a second wave of five countries: Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and 
Slovakia.
Enlargement is a complex and challenging issue. Much of the work to 
make enlargement possible is being done within the candidate countries 
themselves. Their economies must succeed in closing the development gap with 
respect to the EU, carry out transition to a market economy and revise their 
national legislation. This applies to the Baltic States as well as to the other 
Central and Eastern European countries.
In general, markets already function reasonably well in the most candidate 




























































































most of the restrictions on entry for new companies have been removed and 
currency arrangements have been liberalised. Reforms have been implemented 
in the financial sector and subsidies have been eliminated. Many countries have 
also completed privatisation of small-scale enterprises and progress has been 
made in privatising larger enterprises. However, in several areas of economic 
activity, effective and transparent corporate governance and appropriate 
standards for conducting business still have a long way to go. This applies, in 
particular, to enterprise restructuring, the strengthening of financial institutions, 
commercialisation of infrastructure and environmental protection. In addition, 
since the Central and Eastern European countries want to become EU members, 
their legal restructuring must take into account demands of the internal market 
of the Union. The reform of the civil, trade, and economic codes, aiming at the 
adjustment to a market economy, is pushed forward in all countries.
From the Union’s side, the accession strategy is based mainly on five 
elements:
1. Association Agreements (Europe Agreements) on economic co-operation;
2. The White Paper on approximation of laws;
3. The PHARE programme of economic aid to the associated countries;
4. Structured dialogue consisting of meetings of heads of state and 
government and ministerial meetings; and
5. The accession partnerships48 forming the keystone of the whole accession 
strategy.
As a stepping-stone to membership, and in order to boost trade between the 
Community and the CEECs, the EU has signed Association Agreements - 
Europe Agreements - with each individual Central and Eastern European 
Country. Apart from Slovenia, ratification has been completed and the 
agreements are in force. They acknowledge the interest of a partner country in 
becoming a full member of the EU. Moreover, they are preferential agreements 
designed to establish a close, long-term association between the EU and 
individual CEECs. The driving goal for the Association Agreements is to create 
a climate of mutual confidence necessary to the demands of the internal market 
and stability favouring political and economic reform in the CEECs. 
Furthermore, partners in Central and Eastern Europe should be enabled to 
participate in a wider process of European integration. The objective of the 
Association Agreements is to establish a free trade area by the year 2002, 
liberalising trade in industrial products and providing a basis for economic co­
operation in a large number of sectors. In addition, parties shall try to encourage 
a climate for trade and investment, improve the transparency of Community 
financial support and promote a two-way flow of information and co-operation. 




























































































intensifying political dialogue, removing of trade barriers (customs duties, 
quantitative restrictions and measures having equivalent effect) and the gradual 
harmonisation of principles covering the movement of workers, establishment of 
firms and supply of services. Concrete actions have also included liberalisation 
of payments and capital as well as harmonisation of competition policies. 
Finally, the agreements call for improvement of protection of intellectual, 
industrial and commercial property rights and approximation of legislation to 
that of the Community.
The multidimensional feature of the Association Agreements supports our 
working hypothesis: regional arrangements between the Baltic States and the EU 
(as well as between other CEECs and the EU) involve deep integration and 
significant reform efforts from the candidate countries. Despite the multi-level 
and multi-type characteristics of these agreements, the next part of the study will 
focus only on the progress in trade liberalization in industrial and agricultural 
goods between the EU and the Baltic States, origin rules as well as some of the 
other commercial policy measures laid down in the Association Agreements.
Association Agreements between the EU and the Baltic States:
How Liberal?
When we analyze the preferential trade arrangements between the EU and other 
countries, the first important point to be made is that there is not a standard form 
of preferential trade agreement with the EU.49 While agreements often cover 
most or all of industrial goods, some products, i.e. textiles and clothing, coal and 
steel have been, or still are, subject to special quotas. In addition, liberalization 
is asymmetric and transition periods vary. With regard to trade in agriculture, 
access to the EU markets is often selective, product-based and well protected.50 
These fundamental characteristics apply also to the preferential trade agreements 
between the EU and the Baltic States.
At the beginning of 1995, Free Trade Agreements between the EU and the 
Baltic States entered into force. In February 1998, the Free Trade Agreements 
were replaced by the Association Agreements, which the Baltic countries had 
signed already in June 1995.51 However, as far as trade in goods is concerned, 
the Association Agreements neither altered nor added to the provisions of the 
FTAs already concluded. Negotiations begun on 30 March 1998 with the first 
wave of six countries: Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland 
and Slovenia. Finally, on 13 October 1999, in its regular report on progress 
towards accession by each of the candidate countries, the Commission proposed 
that accession negotiations should be opened also with the remaining candidate 




























































































According to the Association Agreements between the Community and 
individual Baltic States, a free trade area will be established in transitional 
periods lasting maximum of four (Estonia and Latvia) to six (Lithuania) years.52 
In addition, the aim is to create a free trade area in conformity with the 
principles of the GATT and the WTO.53 The standstill clause, which is an 
important element of these agreements, rejects any increase in protection 
starting from the day before the entry of the agreement (1 January 1995). In 
other words, the duties in force earlier constitute the basis of the agreement.54 As 
regards to industrial goods, the Association Agreements divide them into three 
groups: 1) textiles and clothing, 2) coal and steel products, and 3) other 
industrial products. The first two groups are often referred as the Community’s 
sensitive sectors. As far as textiles and clothing products are concerned, the 
Association Agreements originally covered only customs duties. Quantitative 
restrictions were dealt with the separate Textiles Protocol. However, since the 
beginning of 1998, all quantitative restrictions as well as the other restrictive 
measures have been abolished on imports of textiles and clothes into the EU.55 
With regard to trade in steel products, quantitative restrictions were abolished 
from the entry of the Baltic-EU Association Agreements (February 1998). 
Customs duties on steel products were eliminated for all associated countries 
already on 1 January 1996. Regarding coal and related products, both customs 
duties and quantitative restrictions were fully eliminated by the beginning of 
1996.
At present, Estonia maintains one of the most liberal trade regimes in the 
world.56 Tariffs, quantitative restrictions and other protectionist measures have 
largely been abolished and trade-related subsidies are limited mainly to the 
agricultural sector. No tariffs except for furs, motorcycles, cycles and 
recreational boats are being applied.57 In addition, export duties are applied only 
on objects of cultural value. Estonia’s liberal foreign trade regime has also 
contributed to the very liberal trade between Estonia and the EU. Customs duties 
and quantitative restrictions for industrial products were abolished from the 
beginning of 1995, on entry into force of the FTA.58 Respectively, no customs 
duties or quantitative restrictions are presently applied for industrial products 
traded between Latvia and the EU.59 In EU-Lithuania trade, quantitative 
restrictions for industrial products have been abolished since the beginning of 
1995. However, Lithuania still applies customs duties on some industrial goods, 
but these will be progressively eliminated by 1 January 2001.60
Unlike in of the regulations of industrial products, the Association 
Agreements do not provide very liberal trade in agricultural or processed 
agricultural goods. Concessions are used but none of them significantly 
liberalize trade. In general, the tariff concessions only apply 




























































































concessions granted by the agreements seem to result in a serious disturbance in 
the markets of the partner country, the “suffering” party can adopt measures to 
restrict imports. When one compares agricultural trade arrangements between 
the EU and individual Baltic countries, Estonia makes a clear exception in terms 
of the degree of liberalization: it has fully liberalized market access, whereas the 
EU has offered so called ‘selective liberalization’ for products of Estonian 
origin. Concessions either with unlimited access or in the framework of tariff 
quotas are used. No quantitative restrictions are applied to agricultural imports 
into the Community or to imports into Estonia.61 The liberal attitude towards 
agricultural imports in Estonia has recently been challenged, especially after the 
outbreak of the Russian economic crisis in August 1998 which negatively 
affected Estonian food exporters.62
With respect to agricultural trade arrangements between the Community 
and Latvia, and the Community and Lithuania, no quantitative restrictions are 
applied. Concessions on reciprocal basis are used.63 Higher tariffs are applied in 
particular on processed products like sugar and butter.
Since July 1996, the Association Agreements have been modified to take 
into account the Agreement on Agriculture concluded during the GATT 
Uruguay Round, and also to reflect further improvements in the concessions on 
agricultural products granted to the Baltic States.64 The GATT related 
adjustments, together with new concessions decided by the Community, have 
increased the preference level for all agricultural products from 60% to 80%. 
Furthermore, the general applicable duty has decreased from 40% to 20%.65
In addition to the restrictions still applied to trade in agricultural products, 
the Association Agreements contain various contingent commercial policy 
instruments, namely a general safeguard clause, an anti-dumping clause, export 
safeguards, a special safeguard clause, and anti-subsidy measures. The main 
idea behind these instruments is that they provide the possibility to deviate from 
a trade liberalization agreement when a party’s interests are affected. This 
includes, for example, situations where the increase in imports causes or 
threatens to cause significant damages to domestic producers (goods and 
services) and/or in a particular sector of economic activity or region. The same 
applies to exports in cases of serious shortages. An anti-dumping clause gives 
the right to penalize products which are being sold in the receiver’s market at a 
lower price than they are sold on the trade partner’s own market. The anti­
subsidy measure functions similarly, but it is applied when a foreign competitor 
is receiving state subsidies. Finally, the specific safeguard clause is addressed to 
the association countries; in the case of infant industries, sectors under 




























































































protectionist measures against the imports coming from the Union. Exceptional 
duties are usually in the form of increased customs duties.
Rules of origin are important in implementing trade policy instruments, 
such as anti-dumping and safeguard measures. The EU has general origin rules, 
which are applied to MFN trade. These rules also conform with the WTO rules 
following from the GATT 1994 agreement.66 However, these WTO rules do not 
apply to preferential trade agreements, such as the Association Agreements. In 
the EU’s preferential trade arrangements, “substantial transformation” and 
“sufficient working or processing” serve as a general foundation for the 
determination of the rules of origin.67 According to the most common rule 
applied in the Association Agreements, 60 percent of the value of the product 
must be derived from the value added in the associated country. However, the 
rules of origin applied in the EU’s MFN trade have been less stringent than 
origin rules under preferential trade agreements.68 Depending on the results of 
the ongoing harmonization process of origin rules, both inside the EU and 
within the WTO framework, some improvements are likely to result in the 
future. Since the beginning of 1997, the Baltic countries, as well as the other 
CEECs and EFTA States, have all been covered by “pan-European cumulation 
of origin”, in which the origin of products can be moved around while still 
qualifying for preferential tariff treatment.69
Chapter 2 introduced some of the general themes of old and new 
regionalism. Chapters 3-5 analyzed the applicability of six specific hypotheses 
of new regionalism in preferential trade relations between the EU and the Baltic 
States. In the following discussion, we shall return to the more general but 
fundamental question of new regionalism: whether preferential trade 
arrangements hinder or promote multilateral trade liberalization initiatives. 
Indeed, slow liberalization in agricultural trade, the commercial policy 
measures, as well as various other provisions in the Association Agreements, 
have sometimes been criticized for hindering further trade liberalization efforts 
rather than promoting them. Whether or not this critique is justified is the topic 
of the next Chapter.
PTAs, WTO and the Multilateral Trade System
WTO and Preferential Trade Arrangements
The multilateral trading system of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) has, no doubt, played a crucial role in worldwide trade liberalization 
process. It has been the promoter in reducing trade barriers worldwide (see 
Table 8). So far there have been eight rounds of trade negotiations, the latest 




























































































Round.71 The main principle followed by GATTAVTO in internatibhyFHrade 
relations has been the ‘most favored nation’ treatment (MFN) (Article I). 
According to this rule, any advantage in terms of trade policy applied to another 
country must be applied, immediately and unconditionally, in the same way to 
all other GATT/WTO contracting parties.72 Discrimination against imports from 
a particular country/countries is prohibited. True, this MFN principle is applied 
only to GATTAVTO members and therefore falls short of being worldwide. 
However, membership in the organization is open to all countries that meet the 
criteria for admission. Another core principle of GATT/WTO is that of 
reciprocity, according to which the mutual changes in trade policy should result 
in equal changes in import volumes across trading partners. Finally, the 
principle of national treatment (Article III) calls for the equal treatment of 
nationals and foreigners as regards to regulations and/or commercial policy 
measures. From a regional point of view, an important notification is that the 
GATT makes provision for certain exceptions to the MFN-rule. The best known 
is the Article XXIV, which allows countries to establish preferential trading 
areas: free trade areas and customs unions. For example, regional blocks, such 
as the European Union, are indeed considered consistent with the WTO/GATT, 
although they can pose a threat to its basic conception of the world trading 
system. In addition, PTAs including partial preferences are allowed for 
developing countries. A third exception where PTAs are allowed is within the 
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), according to which developed 
countries can grant trade preferences to developing countries. All in all, the 
principal requirement is that the purpose of a regional trade agreement should be 
to facilitate trade between the constituent territories, not to raise barriers to the 
trade of other WTO Members which are not parties to the agreement.73
Referring to trade theory, argument along the lines of Article XXIV has 
been presented by Bhagwati and Panagariya (1996). They find justification for 
PTAs only on two occasions. First, when a group of countries aims at deep 
economic and political integration including capital and labor mobility and 
uniform policies in various fields and, second, when the PTA is set using the 
multilateral trade negotiations approach under GATT/WTO and according to the 
Article XXIV.74 Nevertheless, while making two justifications for PTAs, the 
authors do express their concern about whether policy makers can really 
differentiate between free trade and free trade areas. In addition, it is asked 




























































































the WTO principles, and finally, whether Article XXIV could be so 
strengthened as to ensure that its discipline is respected by member states.
Table 8. Estimated Real Income Effects of the Uruguay Round75
Study and Assumptions Industrial Countries World


















Source: IMF, World Economic and Financial Surveys-World Economic Outlook (Mayl994) 
Table 9.GATT Negotiations Rounds










Source: OECD (1992), Bhagwati (1991)
Association Agreements: for or against the WTO principles?
In principle, the Association Agreements are not bound by the WTO principles. 
They aim at providing preferential treatment over other third countries in trade 
with the EU. To what extent are/are not these PTAs between the EU and the 
Baltic States in line with the rules of the WTO and with the idea of multilateral 
liberalization of trade? Several concerns are worth discussing, some of them 




























































































In particular, the special treatment that has been applied to agriculture and 
earlier also to textiles have been under extensive discussion during the trade 
policy examination sessions in the WTO. For example, the EU is maintaining 
(has maintained) protectionist measures in sectors, in which the Baltic countries 
(and other Central and Eastern European countries) could be expected to have 
some comparative advantage. This can have significant implications on 
economic growth in these countries. In addition, it has been asked whether the 
preferential agreements would raise trade barriers to third countries and also 
what their consequent economic effects are. There have also been concerns 
about the systemic effects of the preferential trade agreements on multilateral 
trading system. Finally, one can ask how different commercial policy 
instruments have affected on the ultimate motive of preventing new protection 
and abolishing the existing trade barriers.
First, it should be noted that no sectors have been excluded from the 
coverage in the Association Agreements. In other words, the aim of 
’’substantially all trade” has been achieved. Nevertheless, changes in the 
composition of the EU-Baltic trade partly reflect the progress in liberalization in 
different sectors. For example, increase in trade of manufactured products 
between Estonia and the EU and also between Lithuania and the EU could partly 
be explained by further liberalization of trade in industrial products. Similarily, 
the share of textiles in foreign trade between the EU and the Baltic countries did 
not change dramatically during the period of 1993 till 1998, which could partly 
indicate the EU’s protectionist trade policy in this sector at the time. As regards 
the agricultural sector, the EU has indicated that at the end of the transition 
period, the only sectors where there might still remain some protective measures 
would be agriculture and fisheries.79 At this point, it should be noted that with 
the ongoing discussion on the Community’s agricultural policy and the WTO 
negotiations to begin at the end of this year, the Community’s agricultural policy 
remains a moving target. Nevertheless, as was already mentioned, the GATT- 
related adjustments, together with the additional concessions decided by the 
Community, have so far increased the preference level for all agricultural 
products and lowered the general applicable duty. If one of the Baltics’ future 
comparative advantages lies in processed agricultural goods, the EU’s 
protectionist policy, if continued, could hamper the exploitation of this 
advantage in the EU markets. In addition, given the fact that the Baltic States 
constitute only a marginal share of the EU’s foreign trade, it is difficult to see 
justification for remaining protection. However, this trade is largely surplus 
trade for the EU and therefore, in itself, adds to the Community’s protectionist 
attitude. Moreover, it should be remembered that if the EU would open its 
agricultural trade with the Baltic States, it would be under political pressure to 
do so with the other Central and Eastern European associated countries as well. 




























































































Furthermore, a part of the access problem related to agriculture has to do with 
the Baltic States’ own difficulties in complying with EU import requirements.80 
Overall, it seems that liberalization has been lower and the protection is likely to 
remain for some of the products that constitute the exportable goods and future 
exportable goods for the Baltic economies. This naturally has some implications 
on the Baltic countries’ possibilities for increasing exports.81
One important point, which is also along the lines of the WTO principles, 
is that since the formation of the FTAs (and later the Association Agreements), 
neither the EU nor the Baltic partners have raised their tariffs, imposed new 
quantitative restrictions or other restrictions. Deviation incentives from this 
principle have been observed only recently and they have mainly been related to 
the agricultural sector.82
Regarding rules of origin, the Association Agreements, in principle, aim 
to provide for full cumulation across the agreements in order to reach a simple 
and transparent system in the overall pre-accession context. The recent changes 
in rules of origin are related to the harmonization of these rules among European 
countries and the establishment of a single territory for the determination of 
origin between the EU, EFTA and the Central and Eastern European countries.83 
As is the case with agricultural liberalization, rules of origin remain also a 
moving target due to the ongoing harmonization process. Moreover, there have 
been various practical difficulties with introducing full cumulation.84 Despite 
these problems, further efforts to promote the cumulation of rules of origin 
should be encouraged. After all, they play a crucial role in developing regional 
trade and creating new business possibilities. The same applies even though 
some of the market access problems related to origin rules are likely to become 
less significant as the non-agricultural tariffs of the EU approach to very low 
levels or zero. From the point of view of the Baltic countries (as well as the 
other associated countries), another interesting observation to be made is that the 
EU’s rules of origin have been/are stricter under preferential trade agreements 
than the rules of origin generally applied to the Union’s MFN trade.85 
Consequently, although customs duties are lower under preferential trade 
agreements, it has been/is still more difficult to obtain origin under the 
Associated Agreements than under MFN trade. It would be difficult to estimate 
how much the Baltic States have been influenced by these ”unequal”origin rules. 
Nevertheless, as a policy recommendation it would seem natural to support the 
idea of harmonization (and simplification) of rules of origin between the EU’s 
preferential and non-preferential agreements.86 All in all, while rules of origin 
are often considered to be purely technical arrangements, their power as an 
important part of commercial policy deserves continuous attention. Rules of 




























































































Whether various safeguards, anti-dumping and anti-subsidy measures in 
the Association Agreements work aginst the ultimate goal of trade liberalization 
greatly depends on how easily these measures could have been/can be adopted 
and for how long they can be maintained. As regards to the duration of these 
protectionist measures, the Agreements state that they cannot be applied for a 
period longer than two to three years (unless otherwise agreed with the 
Association Council).87 However, all measures must be terminated when 
conditions no longer justify their maintenance, and at the latest by the end of the 
transition period. Furthermore, none of the measures can be used in sectors 
where duties or quantitative restrictions were removed more than three years 
ago. One of the weak points related to the commercial policy instruments is that 
both parties can (and have been able to) implement measures with relatively 
short notice; within 30 days or in some extreme cases even immediately. 
Moreover, they can be imposed without too much procedure. A special 
safeguard concerning protectionist rights of the associated countries is a good 
example. Even if no consensus is reached during the consultations between the 
Community and the Association Council, the associated country can adopt 
additional measures without the Community’s approval. The only requirement is 
that the associated country has to submit a plan for phasing them out. Moreover, 
the schedule shall apply for a phasing of these duties two years after their 
introduction, at the latest.88 The possibility of increasing protection by using 
some of the above mentioned measures is gradually becoming limited as the 
transition periods for industrial trade liberalization with Estonia and Latvia have 
already ended and the transition period in Lithuania’s case will end by 2001.
So far only a few anti-dumping cases have been raised by the EU against 
the Baltic States and at present, there are three definitive anti-dumping measures 
in force, one against each Baltic country.89 Moreover, the scope of dumping 
penalties laid on the Central and Eastern European associated countries as a 
whole has been low.90 Despite this, the EU’s anti-dumping regulations and 
procedures still seem to give cause for criticism. Among others, the degree of 
secrecy, the calculation methods, and underestimating the importance of the 
market structure when measuring injury have been the most criticised elements. 
In addition, although the actual number of anti-dumping penalties has been 
relatively low, there are other less obvious but nevertheless significant effects 
that may cause problems to the associated countries in the long-run. Namely, 
that anti-dumping charges can harm the credibility of market reforms and 
thereby also harm the confidence of investors. At the end, this might cause 
injuries in sectors, which are crucial for economic growth in that country. All in 
all, safeguards, anti-dumping and other similar defence measures in the 
Association Agreements can be not considered as the most effective tools for 
encouraging further trade liberalization. This, to some extent, also justifies 




























































































Another interesting aspect related not only to the Baltic-EU preferential 
trade arrangements, but the Association Agreements in general, is the so called 
hub-and-spoke criticism presented by Richard Baldwin.91 The main idea behind 
the argument is that when there is a hub, such as the EU, that dominates the 
economic activity of a certain region and has bilateral trade arrangements with 
peripheral associate countries which themselves have no free trade, the location 
of economic activity is likely to concentrate on the hub. This is because firms 
located in the EU can export freely (at the end of the transition period) within 
the Union or into the associated countries. However, if these firms were located 
in an associated country, they could trade freely with the EU but not necessarily 
with the other associated countries. With regard to the Baltic region alone, 
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania already have industrial and agricultural free trade 
agreements with each other. However, as was mentioned earlier, their 
competitive (rather than complementary) trade structures with each other 
contributes to the hub-and-spoke phenomenon. The hub-and-spoke issue 
becomes even more relevant when one looks at the whole club of associated 
countries, among which there is no full free trade. In this respect, the 
development and enlargement of the CEFTA -  Central and Eastern European 
Free Trade Area- plays a significant role.92
Conclusions
The purpose of this study was to analyze the preferential trade arrangements 
between the Baltic States and the European Union. Theory on regionalism 
constituted the basis of the study and was used to explain some of the static and 
dynamic effects related to preferential trade arrangements. In addition, the six 
specific hypotheses of new regionalism were applied to the Association 
Agreements between the Baltic countries and the EU.
The preferential trade arrangements between the Community and each 
individual Baltic State have characteristics of the new regionalism: reform- 
minded small countries, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, are linking with a large 
neighbor, the EU. This involves significant unilateral reforms in the Baltic 
countries in order to be accepted into the EU. In addition, regional integration 
involves deep integration, from free trade to a common market and harmonized 
rules and policies, but confers relatively minor trade advantages as most of the 
bilateral trade has either already been liberalized or remains protected on 
sensitivity grounds.
During the last decade the European Union’s Single Market Program and 
liberalization according to the WTO principles have improved access conditions 
for the EU’s trading partners. There seems to be a general understanding on the 




























































































Market and through the regional and bilateral agreements are likely to have 
increasing effects on the outside world, and on the multilateral system as a 
whole. This applies not only to the extension of duty-free access on an FTA 
basis, but also through the adoption of the EU’s trading regime by its partners. 
While the EU is bound by the WTO principles and these rules have had an 
influence over the EU’s policy making, criticism is justified in some respects.
The analysis of the Association Agreements between the Community and 
the Baltic States shows that while the EU has played a significant role in 
opening up the EU market for the Baltic industrial products, more can be 
demanded in terms of liberalization in the agricultural trade. In particular, given 
the fact that agriculture is suggested to represent one of the future comparative 
advantages for the Baltic States, and that the Baltic countries constitute only a 
marginal share of the EU’s overall foreign trade, it is difficult to see justification 
for protection remaining. However, the Union’s trade with the Baltic economies 
is mainly surplus trade, which adds to protectionist attitudes within the 
Community. Moreover, if the EU opened up its agricultural trade with the Baltic 
States, it would be under political pressure to do so with the other Central and 
Eastern European associated countries as well. Consequently, the whole issue 
would no longer be marginal in nature. Given the current efforts to reform the 
Community’s agricultural policy and the WTO negotiations to begin at the end 
of this year, the level of agricultural protection, future concessions, and the 
Union’s agricultural policy as a whole will remain dynamic.
When it comes to commercial policy measures — the special safeguard 
clauses, anti-dumping and anti-subsidy regulations -  the Association 
Agreements provide an opportunity to deviate from liberalization and can 
therefore be seen as possible obstacles for further trade liberalization initiatives. 
Part of this risk is, however, gradually being reduced as the transition periods 
come to an end, limiting the possibilities to use these measures.
The Community’s system of ‘origin rules’ is currently being harmonized 
with the aim of establishing a single territory for the determination of origin 
between the EU, EFTA and the CEECs. This, together with the harmonization 
of rules of origin within the WTO framework are likely to improve the 
inequality in the Association Agreements, namely that the origin rules have been 
stricter under the preferential agreements than under the EU’s MFN trade. In 
addition, the access problems related to origin rules are likely to become less 
important to the Baltic exporters, especially in the non-agricultural sectors, 





























































































Finally, it can be concluded that in order to assure the compliance of the 
European Union’s trade policy with the WTO principles, monitoring of both the 
Community’s existing, as well as possible new, preferential trade arrangements 
remains significant.
Niina Pautola





























































































Annex 1. Overview of the European Union’s Trade Policy
During the last decade, the European Union’s Single Market Program and 
liberalization according to the WTO principles have improved access conditions 
for the EU’s trading partners.93 Overall, the EU’s external trade policy can 
generally be characterized as a combination of bilateral, regional and 
multilateral policies. While many of the EU’s trading partners enjoy free trade 
area or other preferential treatment, most of the imports still enter into the EU at 
MFN (most-favored-nation) rates.94 So far, manufacturing has benefited most 
from continued reductions in tariff and non-tariff barriers. Average MFN tariffs 
on industrial goods have fallen from 6 percent in 1995 to 4.9 percent in 1997. 
Further reductions, as part of the Uruguay Round, will result in an average MFN 
tariff for industrial products under 3 percent at the turn of the century.95 In 
agricultural sector, average rates are still higher, but nonetheless have been 
reduced from 25 percent in 1995 to 20.8 percent 1997.96 Protection measures 
also remain significant in some of the sensitive industrial sectors such as 
textiles, automobiles and consumer electronics. However, as a result of WTO 
Agreements and under bilateral arrangements, most of the restrictions 
concerning the sensitive products will be abolished at the turn of the century, or 
shortly thereafter. The liberalization of services trade and harmonization of 
standards has proceeded steadily, but significantly slower than, for example, 
liberalization of industrial trade. Nevertheless, service sector is becoming more 
important and the removal of restrictions, both externally as well as within the 
Single Market has therefore become one of the EU’s main policy objectives. 
Indeed, the EU has been very active in promoting GATS97 negotiations. When it 
comes to the overall nature of protection in the EU, the border protection is 
gradually being reduced, while more attention is being drawn to internal 
obstacles to trade, such as competitiveness and more efficient resource 
allocation. In recent years, there has been an increase in the number of 
competition policy cases, which have contributed to the EU’s growing interest in 
developing competition policies at the multilateral level. Compared to 
international standards, government assistance to the EU economy has been 
significant. This applies especially to agriculture and services. With regard to 
the Community’s Common Agricultural Policy, the Commission’s Agenda 2000 
communication of July 1997 and the policy reforms proposed in the Agenda 
2000 in March 1998 indicate that farm subsidies as well as other regulations of 
the Community’s agricultural policy will require changes. Some of the 
suggested reforms include the adoption of more market-oriented measures with 
less support on price mechanisms and export subsidies, less intervention and a 
shift towards direct income support.98 In terms of anti-dumping, the EU still 
remains an important user of anti-dumping procedures. Current challenges in 
rules of origin deal with the harmonization of these rules among European 




























































































the fact that these agreements should be in line with and support the multilateral 
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43 In 1993, the share of the EU as one trading partner was not registered in Lithuanian national
statistics.
44 Country specific data on the composition of trade flows is not collected for each country. In 
this study, information concerning the trade structure with the EU is based on the Eurostat 
statistics, the EU Commission Opinion and trade statistics provided by the Baltic National 
Statistical Offices.
45 Observations are based on the trade statistics provided by the Baltic statistical offices. For 
more detailed analysis of trade between the Baltic States and the European Union, see: Kaitila 
&Widgren, forthcoming in 1999.
46 See the conclusions of Kaitila & Widgren (1999). 26-29.
47 With regard to the likely effects of the CEECs joining the European Union, see: Baldwin, 
Francois and Portes (1997), 125-76. The article reviews some of the main cost-benefit 
calculations on enlargement.
48 The accession partnerships were launched on 15 March 1998 and include three basic 
components:




























































































2) programming for the Union’s financial assistance,
3) terms applying to this aid; compliance with the obligations under the Association 
Agreements and progress in meeting the Copenhagen criteria.
49 Annex 1 presents an overview of the European Union’s trade policy.
50 World Trade Organization, http://www.wto.org: Policy Reviews (1997), Pelkmans & 
Brenton (1997)
51 These agreements were notified under the Article XXIV of the GATT in June 1995. Finnish 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. EU Secretariat. NL 1/1999.
52 These transitional periods apply starting from the entry into force of the Agreement of Free 
Trade and Trade Related Matters: on 1 January 1995.
53 Europe Agreements.
54 For Estonia, the basic duty for each product covered by the Association Agreement was that 
applied on January 1994 (Article 8). In case of Latvia, the basic duties, with few exceptions, 
were mainly those applied on January 1995 (Article 8). For Lithuania, the basic duty, 
depending on the product, was that applied either on March 1994, or January 1995 (Article 8).
55 Mayhew (1998). 63.
56 In 1998, the foreign trade turnover of goods and services amounted to 168 % of the GDP 
(166% in 1997) in Estonia. There are only a few countries in the world with a so open 
economy where the foreign turnover of goods and services exceeds the GDP to such an 
extent. Bank of Estonia, Newsletter N1(200) 20.3.1999.
57 The European Commission: Regular Report from the Commission on Estonia’s Progress 
Towards Accession. November, 1998.
58 Europe Agreement between the European Community and Estonia, Document
298A0309(01): Articles 9-16., Mayhew (1998).
59 Europe Agreement between the European Community and Latvia, Document
298A0202(01): Article 9-17., Mayhew (1998).
60 Europe Agreements between the European Community and Lithuania, Document 
298A0220(01):
Article 9-17. Industrial products on which customs duties still apply, see Annex II, III, IV and 
V. Mayhew (1998).
61 Europe Agreement between the European Community and Estonia, Document
298A0309(01):
Articles 17-20. Agenda 2000, Commission Opinion (1997).
62 Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition, Russian and Baltic Economies 
4/1999.
63 Europe Agreement between the European Community and Latvia, Document
298A0202(01): Article 18-21. Europe Agreements between the European Community and 
Lithuania, Document 298A0220(01): Article 18-21.
64 The European Commission:http://europa.eu.int. Policies. Free Trade and Association 
Agreements with the EU. 1997.
65 The European Commission:http://europa.eu.int. Policies. Free Trade and Association 
Agreements with the EU.1997.
66 Article IX.
67 The European Commission. 1998. Comm(98)0389 final. Rules of origin defined in the 
context of preferential arrangements.
68 1) Community Legislation Doc. 394D0800”Relations in the Context of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade”. 2) The Europe Agreements between the EU and Estonia, 
Latvia and Lithuania.




























































































70 The recent EU-US dispute over bananas and beef have clearly shown the usefulness of such 
a dispute settlement system as well as difficulties associated with it.
71 See more: IMF, World Economic Outlook (1994). The Uruguay Round: the main results 
and implications.
72 OECD (1992)
73 WTO. http://www.wto.org. Regionalism and the Multilateral Trading System.
74 WTO. http://www.wto.org
75 These estimates were under criticism at the time. Nevertheless, they give, if nothing more, 
at least some indication about the results of the Uruguay Round.
76 Trade liberalization was based on the market access offers as of November 19, 
1993;liberalization of tariff equivalents of Multi-fibre Agreement Quotas; 20 percent cuts in 
tariff equivalents of agricultural production subsidies; and 36 percent cuts in tariff equivalents 
of agricultural border measures. Includes gains from induced capital accumulation. Gains 
were measures in 2005, expressed in 1992 dollars.
77 Tariffs and ad valorem equivalent non tariff barriers (NTBs)were reduced by 36 percent in 
manufactures, agricultural goods, and other imported goods. Information on tariffs and NTBs 
at the tariff line level were utilized. Gains were measured in 2002, expressed in 1992 dollars 
and as a percent of GDP.
78 Time refers to the year when the negotiations were launched.
79 WTO. http://www.wto.org: “Policy Reviews. Examination of the Free Trade Agreements 
between the European Communities and Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania” (1997).
80 For example, in terms of recent concession granted to Latvia, since January 1998 six dairy 
processing establishments have been licensed to export to the EU. However, as of July 1998, 
no Latvian slaughterhouse has received the authorisation for exports to the EU, which is 
important given the fact that the Latvia’s exports potential to the EU lies partly in meat and 
dairy products. The European Commission. 1999.
81 Similar conclusions concerning the effects of the Association Agreements has been made 
also in case of other CEECs (Schulz, 1995).
82 For example, at the beginning of March this year, the Lithuanian government announced a 
decision to change the tax valuation of imported agricultural goods. The purpose of this 
measure is to modify the valuation of goods so that they correspond to the real market values. 
Lithuania plans to apply the measure until 2000. (Baltic News Service, 9.3.1999). Since 
beginning of June, Latvian government established a ban for imported beef, which is to 
remain till the end of this year (Russian and Baltic Economies 23/99. Bank of Finland. 
Institute for Economies in Transition). Both actions are considered to be against the Baltic 
Free Trade Agreement.
83 Under harmonized system, goods or combination of goods shall be regarded as originating 
when all component articles are originating products. When a set is composed of originating 
and non-originating articles, the set as a whole shall be regarded as originating provided that 
the value of the non-originating articles does not exceed 15 %  of the ex-works price of the set. 
Ex-work price = the price after deducting any internal taxes which are, or may be repaid when 
the product obtained is exported. The European Commission, DG1; Origin of Goods.
84 See more detail discussion: Mayhew (1998). 67-71.
85 Mayhew (1998). 68.
86 Upon the implementation of the harmonisation, the origin of a particular good is either the 
country where the good has been wholly obtained, or when more than one country is 
concerned in the production of the good, the country where the last substantial transformation 




























































































87 See: The Europe Agreements, Article 27 in case of Estonia, and Article 28 in case of Latvia 
and Lithuania.
88 The Association Council may decide on a different schedule for the elimination of the 
exceptional measures.
89 The European Commission. DG1. Information Office. 12.4.1999.
90 See related discussion: Mayhew (1998). p.93-99.
91 Baldwin (1994).
92 Indeed, membership and trade concessions of CEFTA are expanding.
93 The first Single Market Review (completed at the end of 1996) showed, among others, that 
third country suppliers of goods, services and investment to the EU had benefited from the 
single market program just as much as people and companies within the EU.
94 WTO
95 WTO. http://www.wto.org: WTO Trade Reviews, WTO Implementation and Single Market 
Completion Lead to Greater Liberalization in the European Union (1997).
96 Higher tariffs are applied especially to cereals, meat, dairy and poultry, sugar and tobacco.
97 General Agreement on Trade in Services.
98 European Commission, http://europe.eu.int: Agenda 2000, the legislative proposals. March 
18, 1998. Brussels.
99 See more: WTO. http://www.wto.org: WTO Trade Reviews, WTO Implementation and 
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